Tapol bulletin no, 81, June 1987 by unknown
The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
T APOL Bulletin No. 81 June 1987 
Human rights lawyer 
suspended 
Indonesia's leading human rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung 
Nasution has been suspended from practising as a lawyer 
for a year. The decision was taken by the Justice 
Minister, Lieutenant-General Ismail Saleh, on 11 May, 
fifteen months after the first moves were made in Jakarta 
to have Buyung disbarred for alleged contempt of court. 
Mulya Lubis, chair of the Indonesian Foundation of 
Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI), condemned the decision as 
being without basis in law. "This is a serious matter and 
a threat to the legal profession. Not only does it 
violate the law but it is also on excess because the Bar 
Association (Ikodin), Buyung's professional organisation, 
hos already passed judgement on him". Mulyo was referring 
to o decision by the central Board of Honour of Ikodin to 
reprimand Buyung strongly for interrupting the court 
proceedings during the trial of retired Lieutenant-
Generol,H.R. Dhorsono which ended in January 1986. 
Lubis said there is as yet no basis in Indonesian law 
for contempt of court proceedings against anyone 
[Kompas, 16 Moy 1987). 
Moves to hove Buyung disbarred began in February 1986, 
a month after Buyung protested in court when the panel of 
judges, in their verdict against his i:lient, Dharsono, 
accused his lawyers of unethical behaviour [See TAPOL 
_ Bulletins,_ No 74 and 75, March and May 1986). 
Buyung's practice already severely hit 
The long drawn out moves to disbar Buyung have already 
caused irreparable damage to his practice in Jakarta. 
Other lawyers have withdrawn from his office while 
clients have shifted their business elsewhere. 
Buyung is currently in Holland completing a law 
dissertation on Indonesian constitutional law, supported 
by a grant from the Dutch Government. Buyung did not 
learn of his suspension until the news appeared in the 
Dutch press almost a week later. 
In April this year, Buyung received a letter from the 
Indonesian ambassador in Holland informing him that the 
Minister of Justice was intending to toke administrative 
action against him, and giving him two weeks to defend 
himself. 
Buyung accuses minister of violating the law 
In an outspoken reply to the minister, made public in 
Indonesia and Holland, Buyung accused Ismail Saleh of 
violating four legal principles and seeking to promote 
the political interests of those in power instead of 
upholding the rule of law. Buyung's four points were: 
• The notification about the minister's intention to take 
administrative action failed to specify the deed for 
which he was to be punished, or explain the nature of the 
action to be taken. Nor did the minister clarify the 
legal grounds for giving Buyung only two weeks to defend 
himself. 
• Laws in force at the time of Buyung's alleged offence 
did not allow the minister to take action against a 
lawyer for his conduct in a court of law. A subsequent 
piece of legislation, Law No 2, 1986 on the Courts o' 
Law, does give the justice minister powers to act against 
lawyers but it specifies that this must not violate the 
principle of the independence of the judiciary which 
therefore excludes interference by the Executive in the 
conduct of trials. In any case this law was enacted after 
the alleged offence. 
• No deed may be tried and punished more than once. 
Buyung's alleged offence has already been penalised by 
the Court of Honour of the lawyers' association, lkadin, 
and by the Supreme Court which both decided to issue 
stern warnings to Buyung for his action during the final 
session of the Dharsono trial. Buyung said he regarded 
such a penalty as a ''realistic compromise" in the current 
political climate between protecting the rule of law and 
upholding the independence of the judiciary on the one 
hand, and pressure from those in power for him to be 
punished on the other. Pl 
ease turn to the baclc page. 
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Election: 
The shifting sands of the 'New Order' 
As everyone agrees, the election held on 23 April hod 
nothing to do with democracy. A landslide victory for 
the government party, Golkor, was never in doubt. Nor is 
there any doubt about the government that will replace 
the present one in Morch 1988, as oil three parties hove 
already pledged to support General Suharto os the sole 
presidential candidate next year. 
For Indonesian voters, elections hove become o 
meaningless exerc.ise, the only advantage being that for 
the few weeks when campaigning is allowed, people con 
let off steam in rallies and parades. 
All three 'contestants', Golk or or the functional 
groups, the PPP or the development unity party and the 
PDI or the Indonesian democracy party, fully bock 
government policies. They adopted the Poncosilo as their 
sole doctrine and received funding from the government 
while all their candidates were screened by army 
intelligence. The word 'contestant' was banned; the 
parties were referred to instead as 'OPP' or 
organisations participating in the election). 
But this election did serve as a barometer of the 
political climate, giving signs of underlying trends as 
reflected in the behaviour of the three parties and the 
campaign tactics they adopted. 
The new share-out of seats 
The new DPR or parliament will hove 500 seats, 40 
more than at present. One hundred w i 11 go to armed 
forces appointees. Golk or, with 73 per cent of the 
votes, will get 298 seats (242 at present), the PPP, 
with 16 per cent of the votes, will be down from 94 
to 63, and the PDI, with 11 per cent, will go up 
from 24 to 39 seats. 
The results will also affect the composition of the 
upper house or MPR (Consultative Congress), the body 
which elects the president and sets the brood lines 
of government policy. Half of the MPR's 1,000 seats 
will go to the members of the DPR and the rest will 
be shared out as fol lows: 
Functional groups 
Regional seats 










The final results of the provincial and local 
assembly elections held on 23 April have not yet been 
announced but the shore-out of seats will certainly 
follow the pattern established in the DPR elections. 
PDI 
The armed forces and Golkar in contest 
The indications ore that this time round there were not 
many major incidents. Poll rigging and manipulation 
certainly occurred but the army was not directly involved 
except in places where armed resistance is being waged 
like West Papua, East Ti mor and Aceh. [More of this 
below.] 
Long before the elections took place, the armed forces 
announced that this time they would not side with Golkor. 
Indeed, there was no need as oil the parties fully back 
the regime. But there may be deeper reasons for the 
change. It is widely recognised that the commonder-in-
chief, General Benny Murdani was instrumental in bringing 
about the PD l's re-emergence last year as a virtually new 
party. One of the more obvious reasons for the army's 
professed neutrality was that once all parties had been 
forced to accept Poncosilo as their sole principle, 
Golkor's standing would grow, threatening the pre-
eminence of the armed forces. Lurking behind this 
competition is the rivalry between Golkar's chairman, 
General Sudharmono, and General Murdani who both wont to 
become vice-president in 1988. 
The PPP1s continuing strength 
The nine per cent increase in Golkar's share of the 
votes, from 64 per cent in 1982 to 73 per cent, is not 
as spectacular as it appears. These were mainly the votes 
of the followers of the Nahdatul Uloma which, until 
1985, was the main component of the PPP. After the 
Nohdotul Ulomo withdrew from the PPP, its leaders did 
everything possible to spike their former party, advising 
their followers to vote for Golkar. As a result this 
segment of the Muslim vote abandoned the PPP, as is clear 
from the results in NU strongholds like East Java and 
South Kalimanton where the PPP suffered a big fall in 
votes. 
But despite the odium widely felt for the PPP chairman, 
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John Naro, a well-known former intelligence operative, 
devout Muslim voters elsewhere did not desert the PPP. 
Surprisingly, the party still retains a residual Islamic 
image despite the adoption of Pancasila and the enforced 
replacement of the sacred Ka'baah stone as its election 
symbol. 
Of the three parties, the PPP alone lacked a newspaper 
promoting its campaign. Golkar could rely on Suara 
Korya, Berito Buono, and Pelito, recently snatched from 
PPP control, while the POI was reasonably well supported 
by · Kompas, Suora Pemboruan and Prioritas. As for 
speakers, Golkor fielded government ministers ready to 
promise the earth while the PD I had speakers with a 
populist appeal in the cities as compared with the 
colourless, discredited men appearing on PPP platforms. 
Against such odds, it is surprising how well the PPP vote 
held up. 
Golkor's 'victory' in Aceh 
Already months ahead of the election, it was clear 
that Golkar regarded Aceh in North Sumatra as the key 
test of its virility. In the 1982 election, the PPP won 
59 per cent of the votes. Moreover, Aceh has long been 
the centre for anti-Indonesian movements, the latest 
being the Aceh Liberation Front set up in the 1970s. 
Responsibility for boosting Golkar's position fell to 
the newly-appointed governor, Ibrahim Hassan, who comes 
from a devout Muslim background. Unlike previous 
governors, he is not mi Ii tary nor is he one of the much-
despi.sed Java-based Acehnese bureaucrats, having spent 
all his professional career as an academic in Aceh. Here 
for the first time was a credible Muslim figure 
advocating the Golkar cause. He travelled widely for six 
months, praying in different mosques almost every day to 
spread. th~ Golk.or message, despite the ban on party 
campaigning until four weeks before polling day. 
Helped along by Hossan's presence, Golkar was able to 
field highly-placed Acehnese bureaucrats like Major-
General Bustanil Arifin, minister of cooperatives and 
chair~an of Bulog, the state food purchasing monopoly, 
and Major-General Abdul Rohman Ramly, president-director 
of the state oi I company, Per tam ina, both members of 
Suharto's palace clique with plenty to cffer the voters. 
Arifin gave a promise that if Golkor won, every sub-
district in the province would receive fifty million 
rupiahs as a reward [Kompas, 27 April]. 
Jom Naro, the chairman of the PPP, campaigning in Aceh. 
[Tempo, 18 April 1987] 
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Yet with all Hossan's efforts, Golkar ended up with 
only 51 per cent of the votes while the PPP share fell to 
44 per cent. Even this result appears to hove been the 
result of widespread cheating, if the many complaints 
mode by PPP off iciols are to be believed. Nevertheless, 
Golkor's 'victory' has been acclaimed in Jakarta as an 
outstanding achievement. Not only is it seen as a defeat 
for Islam but as a sign that anti-Indonesian sentiments 
are in retreat. This is revealed in a comment by an 
American observer who claimed that the election results 
show that Aceh "is increasingly taking its place as a 
part of Indonesia" {William Liddle in Tempo, 2 May 
1987]. Such a remark is not unlike the claims being made 
'lbout the election result in East Timor! 
The Golkar campaign 
Important changes have occurred in Golkar since the 
last election. At its congress in 1983, it abandoned its 
federal structure. It became a membership party and 
quickly began to train millions of party functionaries. 
With General Suharto as chairman of its honorary board 
and General Sudharmono, the State Secretary and head of 
the bureaucracy, as its general chairman, it also set out 
to 'civilianise' its image by appointing a well-known 
former student leader, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, as 
secretary-general. It is no longer a party that exists 
only for election purposes, and its position as the 
bureaucrats' party has been greatly enhanced. 
These changes have lost it the support of an older 
generation of generals who still control former Golkar 
organisations like Soksi and Kosgoro; men like General 
Suhardiman and General Sugandhi took no part in this 
year'.s camp.aign. [General Suhardiman is now reportedly 
making a bid to replace Naro as PPP chairman.} 
. Other well-known public figures also kept their 
d1st~nce. The Sulton of Jogjo, Indonesia's vice-
p~es1dent from 1972 to 1979, seemed to be sending out 
signals to anyone who understands Javanese mannerisms 
when he absented himself from a Golkar rally by showing 
a doctor's certificate. Not long afterwards, he looked 
surprisingly fit touring polling stations on polling day. 
Another conspicuous absentee was General Moh. Jusuf, 
armed forced commander- in-chief from 1978 to 1983 an 
officer with something of a populist appeal as a ge1n;rol 
who 'cared about' the living conditions of rank-and-file 
soldiers. He also led the vicious onslaught against 
Fretilin in East Timor in the late 1970s. 
Being the party of the bureaucracy with its own party 
machine more than made up for the loss of oil-out armed 
forces support. Golkar was still able to benefit from 
the 'floating masses' policy which bans the other parties 
from setting up branches anywhere in the countryside 
below the district capitals. Although the PPP and the 
POI were for the first time allowed to hold rallies 
during the ca~paign do~n to the sub-district capitals, 
r~ral Indonesia was still a virtual Golkar bastion. 
Village heads were able to cajole or pressure villagers 
into voting for Golkar, the only party capable of 
promising material rewords or threaten the withdrawal of 
government funds. 
But the current stalemate in relations between the 
Golkar and armed forces leaderships which became 
increasingly apparent during the' election could cause 
cracks in the regime as the question of Suharto's 
successor looms ever larger. General Sudhormono now sees 
the. ~dvantage in presenting Golkar as a fully-fledged 
political party [Tempo, 2 May 1987] which means 
accepting equal status with the other parties. It is not 
yet clear whether this means that members of Korpri the 
association which all civil servants ore obliged to Join, 
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are to be free to join other parties if they wish. A big 
shift away from Golkor among civil servants could hove 
major consequences for the party in the next elections. 
Murdoni for his part hos been able to place generals 
loyal to him in some vital posts in the bureaucracy, as 
general secretaries at the deportments of transmigration, 
education and defence. At the some time, he has taken 
steps to ensure that all officers who become members of 
parliament or of local assemblies will do so strictly 
within their military career structure. He seems anxious 
to prevent a haemorrhage of well-trained officers into 
civilian affairs, reinforcing the current estrangement 
between Golkar and the armed forces. Most military 
personnel now in the bureaucracy come from older 
generations and, as things stand at present, there is 
unlikely to be an infusion of new blood from the 
generation now toking over the leadership of the armed 
forces. 
The reborn PD I 
The POI which campaigned in the 1987 election emerged 
as something very different from its former self. Saved 
from extinction in 1986 by several powerful generals 
including Murdani, the POI campaign clearly enjoyed the 
bocking of the armed forces. As the party chairman, 
Soeryodi, himself admitted, "This party exists by the 
grace of initiatives of the rulers" [ Kompos, 11 Moy 
1987]. 
Excluded like the PPP from the rural areas, the PD I 
was nevertheless able to attract a big following in the 
cities. Its rallies in Central Java were far bigger than 
Golkar's and in Jakarta, it surprised oil observers by 
attracting some two million people to its final rally, a 
political event unequalled since the military came to 
power in 1965. The rallies were particularly well 
attended by young people, many carrying portraits of 
Sukarno, Indonesia's first president. The emergence of 
Sukarno as a rallying symbol was reinforced by the 
presence on the platform of the late president's 
daughter, Megowati, the party's leading 'vote-catcher', 
though she was not permitted to speak for more than three 
minutes. 
The POi's sudden surge in popularity led commentators 
to see this as a sign of the desire for change. It would 
be wrong however to regard the POI as a reincarnation of 
Sukarno's early political creation, the nationalist PNI. 
It is very unlikely that Sukarno's politics ore familiar 
to the younger generation. Displaying his portrait seemed 
rather to be a way of showing discontent for the present 
leadership, a cheer for Sukarno being safer than a boo 
for Suharto. 
Since the election, Soeryodi has been at pains to 
reject charges of a return to Sukornoism, focusing on his 
party's appeal to the urban elite. Indeed the POI seems 
to hove attracted the so-coiled 'Mercedes-Volvo' brigade 
along with their offspring, plus traders from the 
informal sector in the cities and those loosely referred 
to as 'orang sandal jepit', the people who wear cheap 
Japanese sandals. Many who attended POI ral~ies.. were 
still too young to vote; in Jakarta, 1.1 million votes 
were cost for the party giving it a 28 per cent shore, 
well above its showing in 1982 but little more than half 
the number of people who filled the streets of the 
capitol on the day of the POI rally. 
It is still too early to gouge the POi's future apart 
from saying that it could become the plotf~rm for 
business interests who are discontented with the 
privileges enjoyed by members of Suharto's poloc~ clique 
and their sons and daughters. The fact that this party 
also hos the bocking of the armed forces leadership soys 
a lot about the current disenchantment among the new 
generation of senior officers towards the cronies now 
supported and protected by Suharto. 
Incidents and manipulations 
Although major incidents did not occur during the 1987 
elections, they were for from being without complaints 
of cheating and irregularities. On the whole, the army 
was under orders to ploy a 'preventive role', whilst the 
police were in charge of guarding polling stations. 
But there is no lock of stories about over-zealous 
off iciols producing manipulated results: 
* In Sidoorjo, East Java registered voters numbered half 
a million, but no fewer than 966,000 votes were cost, 
leading PPP officials to make a formal complain though 
with no hope of any redress. 
* In Aceh, PPP officials in several regions complained 
that many voters did not receive their voting cords. 
* In the Posir district of East Kolimonton, the turnout 
represented 568.39 per cent of registered voters, surely 
worth a mention in the Guiness Book of Records! 
There ore instances of clashes between local officials 
pushing for Golkar and villagers with other ideas. The 
mayor of Solo hod to intervene in the village of 
Songkroh, Posor Kliwon when villagers, the majority of 
whom hod voted for the POI, started booing the village 
head, a Golkar supporter. In Banjornegoro, Central Java 
the Golkar head of district was furious because of the 
Megowati Sukarno addressing the huge POI election rolly 
in Jakarta. [Jakorto Post, 18 April 1987] 
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POi's rising popularity. He punished ten POI activists 
by locking them up in his office. The police intervened 
against the district head who now seems likely to lose 
his job. Such a report would never have appeared in the 
press in previous elections. 
In Madiun, where the PPP and the PD I have both had 
large followings in the past, the local bureaucracy 
decided to claim total victory for Golkar and announced 
that neither of the other two parties had got any votes 
though many people insisted that they hod voted for one 
of these parties. 
The 'golput' vote 
The idea of voting golput, the so-coiled ''white group", 
first emerged in 1971. This is a form of boycott. It 
advocates the spoiling of voting slips by not piercing 
any of the symbols or piercing all three. In Jogjakarta, 
Central Java no fewer than eleven per cent or votes were 
made invalid in this way, according to a survey carried 
out after the election by students at Gajoh Mada 
unlverslty [Kompas, 11 May]. Who knows what similar 
surveys elsewhere would have revealed? 
Needless to say, reports of rigging or of golput 
support hos been sketchy. The actual scale of rigging is 
likely to be for more widespread than the published 
accounts suggest. 
Laying Sukarno's ghost 
The dramatic re-emergence of the POI in Jakarta and the 
sight of such huge crowds carrying banners eulogising 
the president whom Suharto deposed in 1966 hos clearly 
upset the country's military leader. Thoughts about the 
1986 uprising in Manila, responding to the memory of 
Benino Aquino, cannot have been far from people's minds 
as some two million people thronged the streets of the 
capital on 15 April, although it would be wrong to 
compare Cory Aquino's emergence to lead the popular 
revolt against Marcos with Megawati, Sukarno's daughter, 
whose role in the POI campaign was never allowed to be 
anything more that symbolic. 
Jakarta's voters have always been a problem for Golkar 
and Suharto. The capital hos a population that is fast 
approaching eight million and accounts for over eighty 
per cent of the money circulating in the Indonesian 
economy. Being under closer scrutiny by foreign 
journalists and diplomats, the regime hos never been able 
to manipulate the voting in Jakarta on the some scale as 
elsewhere. In 1982 Golkar's share of the votes was less 
than half at 45 per cent, with the PPP accounting for 39 
per cent though this was the first time the PPP foiled to 
toke a majority of the votes. 
Even this time round, the Golkar vote was less than 
half, at 49.6 per cent. The POi's shore rose sharply 
from 16 per cent in 1982 to a remarkable 28.76 per cent, 
while the PPP share fell to 21.65 per cent. 
Re-writing history to downgrade Sukarno 
After more than 22 years in power General Suharto is 
stiJI unable to lay to rest the charisma of Indonesia's 
former president. In recent years he has token moves to 
institutionalise Sukarno's memory, granting him formal 
recognition as a notional hero and agreeing to name the 
country's main international airport after the Sukarno-
Hatto duo as proclomotors of the Republic. Such moves 
have only helped draw attention to a figure regarding 
whose politics the younger generation cannot have more 
than the vaguest conception. 
Now it appears that Suharto wants to lay Sukarno's 
POLITICS 
ghost once and for all. He has handed down several 
instructions in traditionally regal style, speaking 
through the mouths of his ministerial underlings. The 
first to emerge from Bina Grahe, the president's office, 
with an instruction from above was coordinator-minister 
for people's wel fore, General Alamsyah who told reporters 
that the president had ordered a complete re-writing of 
Indonesian history from 1950 to 1965. The duel purpose 
was to correct the younger generation's image of Sukarno 
and to provide a more convincing account of the bloody 
events of 1 October 1965 which Suharto has blamed 
squarely on the Indonesian Communist Porty [Jakarta 
Post, 4 May 1987]. 
Several of the country's leading historians responded 
with warnings about the unreliability of court-inspired 
histories. A few days later, Fuad Hassan, the minister 
of education, emerged from Bina Grahe to assure the press 
that the president had no plans to replace the history 
books now being used in the schools [ Kompas, 8 May]. 
The men described by Jakarta Post as "the Big Three ••• of 
the general elections". Left to right: Interior Minister 
General Soepardjo Rustam, Commander-in-Chief General 
Murdani and Golkar chairman, General Sudharmono. 
Maybe the contradiction between Alomsyah and Fuad can be 
explained by Suharto's changing moods or maybe it 
reflects a serious rift among Suharto's advisers on how 
to deal with Sukarno's ghost. Only time will tell. 
The second move to downgrade Sukarno came through the 
mouth of Martono, the minister of transmigration,· one of 
the 1945 generation of politicians who see themselves as 
protectors of Indonesia's nationalistic heritage. 
Martono emerged from Bina Graha to deny a report that 
Suharto would attend a rally in Jakarta on 1 June to 
commemorate the day in 1945 when Sukarno delivered his 
speech first expounding the Pancasi la as the bosi c 
ideology for a future Indonesian state. 
Since the rally was to have been held under the 
auspices of a group recently set up by Suharto to write 
a history glorifying the Peta Indonesian militia created 
in 1943 by the Japanese army of occupation, Martono's 
denial further confused the signals com Ing from Suharto. 
In Martono's account, the habit of seeing Sukarno as 
the first exponent of the state's ideology must be 
replaced by stressing that Pancosilo hos existed on 
Indonesian soil since time immemorial. If a day of 
commemoration must be set, it should be 18 August, 1945 
when the constitution now used by Suharto to cling to 
power was proclaimed [Kompas, 10 May 1987]. But this too 
was Sukarno's initiative so it is hard to see how the 
regime con shake itself free of the ghost of Sukarno. 
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Indonesian church leaders pave 
the way for 'second integration' 
Leaders of both the Catholic and Protestant churches of 
Indonesia are actively involved in moves to persuade the 
Vatican to integrate the Catholic Church in East Timor 
into the Indonesian diocese. This is being seen as the 
"second integration" of East Timor and would be a major 
boost for the Indonesian government's efforts to remove 
the question of East Timor from the agenda of the United 
Nations, ending the UN's continued recognition of 
Portugal as the administering power of East Timor. 
Until 1975, the Catholic Church in East Timor was part 
of the Portuguese Church, but was then removed from 
Portuguese control and placed under the Vatican's direct 
supervision. The Vatican's refusal till now to pronounce 
the East Timorese Church part of the Indonesian diocese 
is seen in Jakarta as a major obstacle to its endeavours 
to end international support for the right of the people 
of East Timor to self-determination. 
Several documents have been circulated by Indonesian 
church leaders in the past few months in favour of the 
"second integration". One document was produced by Frans 
Seda, a · member of the Pontifical Justice and Peace 
Commission of the Vatican. It is currently circulating 
among Catholic justice and peace commissions in several 
countries. Some members of the Commission in Rome were 
apparently aghast at its pro-integrationist stance. 
Frans Seda is one of Indonesia's leading Catholic 
politicians, formerly chairman of the Partai Katolik 
before it accepted enforced fusion with other Christian 
and nationalist parties to become the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia in 1973. He is also a well-known businessman 
in the textile industry and has recently concluded an 
agreement with Japanese financiers for the exploitation 
of several islands in the Jakarta Bay as tourist 
attract ions. 
The second document was produced by the Indonesian 
Council of Churches (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia) and 
is apparently still in draft form. It is dated October 
1986 and presents a detailed and maliciously inaccurate 
account of events in East Timor since 1974. The PGI 
brazenly interprets the Vatican's decision to shift 
responsibility for the East Timor Church from Portugal 
to the Vatican as a kind of acknowledgement that East 
Timor is an integral part of Indonesia. It is not yet 
clear how widely this document has been circulated 
internationally though national councils of churches in 
several countries are known to be aware of its existence. 
The PGI has for many years been trying to establish a 
Protestant presence among the East Timorese and claims 
that there has been o 5-fold increase in the number of 
Protestants there in the post decade. It claims that 
whereas in 1977 there were 4,000 Protestants in East 
Timor, by 1986 there were 65 Protestant congregations 
with a membership of 19,579 people. The PGI is also 
involved in a number of welfare projects in East Timor 
and has the support of several European and Australian 
church funding agencies to run its "national project" for 
the distribution of aid to East Timorese. 
Catholic students' organisation plea to the Pope 
The third document is a letter from the Indonesian 
Catholic students' organisation, PMKR I to the Pope. The 
letter was handed to the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, Mgr 
Fransisco Canalini, on 25 November lost year by a PMKR i 
delegation headed by the chairperson of its presidium, 
Paulus Jonuar. 
The document openly calls for the immediate integration 
of the Catholic Church in East Timor into the Indonesian 
church. It hos the effrontery to allege that the 
resistance movement in East Timor under Fretilin's 
leadership is a tool of Portuguese colonialism. The 
following quotations ore taken from a report of the 
letter in the Catholic journal, Hidup, No. 4, 1987: 
''Up to now, the Catholic Church in East Timor has not 
yet joined up with the Catholic Church in Indonesia. The 
PMKRI continues to be conscious of the real situation in 
East Timor and the struggle of the people of East Timor 
Paul Barbara, a London cob-driver, 
attempted to cross the Channel to 
Frmce on a raft made in the shape of 
a cross. He was protesting against the 
continued Indonesian occupation of 
East Timor. 
Here he is, leaving St Katherine's 
Deck, London on Good Friday. He 
reached the Thames estuary two days 
later on 19 April and abandoned the 
attempt as his engine was too weak. 
The slogan on the side of his 'cabin' 
reads: "Why is the world silent? 
100,000 - 200,000 East Timorese hove 
died. Stop aiding genocidal Indonesian 
invaders." 
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as an integral part of the Indonesian nation. The East 
Timorese people who feel themselves part of the 
Indonesian nation have manifested their determination to 
integrate with the Republic of Indonesia. The East Timor 
people's longing to integrate with Indonesia did not 
emerged overnight; it has lain buried for a long time. 
It is based not only on political factors but also on 
psychological and sociological factors." 
"The long drawn out crisis in East Timor is the 
consequence of efforts by the Portuguese government to 
preserve colonialism in East Timor in a new form. It 
utilised a local political force there, Fretilin, to 
support its project for a new form of colonialism under 
the guise of decolonisation." 
After accusing Fretilin of terrorising its political 
opponents "who represent the majority of the people", 
the letter requests the Pope to toke the necessary steps 
to unite the church in East Timor with its brothers and 
sisters (in Indonesia). 
This is not the first time the PMKR I has allowed 
itself to be used to undermine international support for 
East Timor. It was heavily defeated at the international 
assembly of Catholic students meeting in Belgium last 
summer when the conference overwhelmingly adopted a 
resolution condemning Indonesia's occupation of East 
Timor. The PMKR I delegation, headed by Paulus Januor, 
refused to discuss the issue and walked out. 
Jesuits to be expelled from East Timor 
Meanwhile, two Jesuits who have been working in East 
EAST Tl MOR 
Timor since the early 1970s are on the verge of being 
expelled from East Timor. They are Father Felgueras, the 
rector of the seminary in Dili, and Father Martens, a 
lecturer at the seminary, who are together seen by the 
Indonesians as "the main block to integrating the East 
Ti morese and Indonesian churches" (The Australia!'\ 23 
April 1987]. According to the same source, some 
seminarians strongly denounced the Indonesian military in 
the presence of Leo Soekoto, the Archbishop of Jakarta, 
also o Jesuit, when he was visiting Dili in January this 
year. 
Father Felgueros is currently on a visit to Portugal 
and has be en told not to return to D ll i. It is expected 
that Father Martens will soon be told to leave. The Dili 
seminary is the one educational institute in East Timor 
which still maintains a non-Indonesian curriculum and 
continues to use both Portuguese and Tetum as languages 
of instruction. 
Another move that appears to be aimed among other 
things at undermining support for East Timor's self-
determination is the widely-condemned decision of the 
Australian Bishops' Conference o few weeks ago to 
disband the Australian Commission of Justice and Peace. 
The Commission hos taken o stand on many human rights 
issues, among them human rights abuses in East Timor. 
Jakarta uses illegal election 
to back 'integration' 
On the day of Indonesia's illegal election in East 
Timor, virtually everyone was forced to travel long 
distances to cast their votes. Although the 725 polling 
booths did not open unti I 8 om, many people left home 
before dawn to make sure they arrived in time to vote. 
All East Timorese people were issued with C voting 
vouchers, which require people to vote in their 'place 
of origin'. Because of the massive resettlement and re-
resettlement that has token place since the late 1970s, 
'place of origin' apparently means the place where people 
were first registered as camp dwellers. Hence, voting day 
was a day of major upheaval. 
"Because everyone entitled to vote hod to leave home 
for several hours, they all hod to lock up their houses 
and toke their children to the polling booths." Normal 
life was virtually at a standstill, with offices and 
markets closed. Public transport was at a standstill 
which meant that many people had to cover long distances 
by foot, carrying food and drink with them for the long, 
gruelling day. [Expedito Dias Ximenes in Suara Pemborual'\ 
30 April 1987]. 
Last-minute security check-up 
Twodaysbeforepolling day, armed forces commonder-in-
chief General Murdoni arrived in Dili with top-ranking 
officers to carry out a so-called 'sidok' or 'on-the-spot 
inspection' to check security arrangements. The group 
included Lieutenant-General Edy Sudrodjat, deputy chief-
of-staff, Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, chief-of-staff 
for social and political affairs, and Major-General 
Rojaguguk,commonderofthelXthUdayona Military Command 
based in Bali whose territory of command includes East 
Timor.Rojaguguk was mi litorycommonderof East Timor for 
several years in the early 1980s. 
Before returning to Jakarta, Murdani made a speech to 
the troops recalling the contribution of the armed forces 
to East Timor's welfare, including the 44.3-kilometre 
rood to Los Palos and the eleven churches constructed by 
the 'voluntary labour of the troops'. He also hod some 
harsh words, apparently for people in the administration: 
"Don't waste ti me day-dreaming, but work hard for 
development" [ Pelita, 24 April 1987). -+ 
Nakroma, official 
journal of Fretilin 
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Manipulated results used to support integration 
As already reported in previous bulletins, the method 
of costing votes in East Timor was exceptional. Instead 
of using one ballot box for each of the three assemblies 
being elected - the DPR in Jakarta, the 'provincial' 
assembly and district assemblies - there were three for 
each election (one for each party), or nine ballot boxes. 
Voting slips were not pierced but hod to be placed i_n the 
appropriate porty box, making it possible to see how each 
person voted. 
As in 1982, the election results in East Timor were 
among the first to be announced in Jakarta, showing a 
turnout of 362,507 votes, or 100.52 per cent of the 















The excess of voters obliged the Interior Minister, 
General Rustom Soepordjo to deny suspicions of foul ploy 
in the vote counting. He claimed that the excess was due 
to the number of Indonesian sailors, civil servants and 
construction workers in East Timor at the time who voted 
with AB-vouchers for 'absentees' voting away from home 
[Jakarta Post, 27 April]. The general mode no attempt to 
explain why, in four regencies, in Dill and three inland 
regions, the turnout was well above one hundred per cent, 
with a turnout of no less than 327.26 per cent in Aileu 
[The Guardian, 28 April]. 
These oddities apart, the regime seemed happy with the 
results. East Timor's governor, Mario Corroscaloo was 
positively overcome. "I don't know how to express my joy 
and emotion over the outcome of the elections which was 
just as I had expected" [Suaro Merdeka, 24 April]. In 
particular he regarded the twenty-fold increase in POI 
votes as proof that the elections were free: 
"The two (sic) previous elections were considered by 
the international world, especially the countries that 
side with Portugal, as not being an expression of the 
wishes of the East Timorese people themselves. This is 
especially so of the 1982 election when Golkor received 
99.45 per cent of the votes cost. Therefore, now th~t 
the PD I has succeeded in getting 20, 163 votes in this 
year's election, the international world can see that 
there was freedom for the East Timorese people to cast 
their votes" [Kompas, 27 April]. 
Both Carrascalao and Foreign Minister Mochtar 
continually stress that there have been three elections 
in East Timor, the first in 1976 in support of 
integration [at a time when Indonesian troops only 
controlled Dill and a few coastal areas and war was 
raging everywhere1 the second in 1982 and the third in 
1987. No-one has ever explained why the occupation 
authorities failed to conduct an election in East Timor 
in 1977 [Suara Pembaruan, 14 April 1987]. There is no 
substance at all to the claim about on election in 1976. 
Corrascoloo was not happy about special method of 
voting used in East Timor, with nine boxes instead of 
East Timorese waiting their turn 
to vote in the election on 23 
April. It is not difficult to 
guess why there is not a happy 
face in sight. [Kompos, 27 April 
1987] 
three, but alleged it was due to the high illiteracy 
rate. [In fact, the method of piercing voting slips used 
throughout Indonesia is always explained in terms of the 
level of illiteracy in Indonesia. The only other place 
where the special voting method was used was in West 
Papua.] 
The POi's improved position 
The big increase in votes for the PD I hod nothing to 
do with 'free choice'. It con be explained primarily by 
the support given to this party by General Murdoni. The 
Suaro Pembaruan report of 30 April written by a Timorese 
journalist explains that the POI began to campaign long 
before the election~, whilst Golkor was active only 
during the campaign. This is a mark of the special 
efforts mode by the armed forces on the POi's behalf for 
it is ~ormolly only Golkor that con cheat by campaigning 
well in advance of the three weeks officially set aside 
for campaigning. 
The h.ighly monipul~ted result hod to avoid the pitfall 
of cutting too deep into the Golkor vote. A high onti-
Golkor vote might hove been interpreted abroad as a 
rejection of integration. A five per cent share for POI 
was apparently also intended as a warning to Indonesian 
bureaucrats whose performance in East Timor is often 
criticised as woeful. 
All the seats for East Timor seats in the DPR will go 
to Golkar but in the 'provincial' assembly, the POI will 
hove two seats as compared with 34 for Golkor and nine 
appointees from the armed forces. Golkar occupied all 
the 'contested' seats in the assembly elected in 1982.* 
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Mochtar's road-show gets a knock 
It was Mochtor Kusumaatmadja, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, who had the honour of being Golkar's main 
candidate in East Timor. Since this was just a ·stunt 
to impress world opinion, it is doubtful whether 
Mochtor will oow represent East Timor in the DPR. 
As Golkor candidate, Mochtar took a party of 
foreign diplomats and journalists on a three-day 
jaunt to East Timor to take part in a road-show 
which included rock groups, marching bands, hundreds 
of Timorese horsemen and traditional dancers 
including Balinese dancers from a transmigration 
site in East Timor. A high turnout, Mochtor claimed, 
would mean it could no longer be denied "that East 
Timor is port of the big family of the Republic of 
Indonesia" [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April]. 
Of the many ambassadors in Jakarta invited to join 
his party, only three went, from Canada, Nigeria and 
East Germany. Most refused as they felt it would be 
diplomatically embarrassing to be supporting the 
minister as o Golkar candidate [For Eastern-Economic 
Review, 23 April). The Canadian ambassador later 
complained: "I did feel like I was being used. I 
only agreed to join this trip if my name and position 
was not mentioned, because it's standard diplomatic 
procedure that ambassadors do not get involved in 
domestic politics" [ SMfi 17 April]. 
More to the point, Portugal's Prime Minister said: 
"We cannot accept these elections. They are pre-
prepared: we know the result in advance" [SMH, 17 
April]. Ina forthcoming document, the Parliamentary 
Human Rights Group says that "having illegally 
invaded and annexed East Timor, Indonesia cannot 
subsequently validate its illegal acquisition by 
conducting elections. In this sense, whether the 
elections ore free or not is entirely irrelevant." * 
Army officers appointed as assistant governors 
Three army officers were sworn in as assistant governors 
in East Timor on 1 April. Colonel Otto Doryono, chairman 
of the East Timor Planning Boord, was installed as the 
assistant governor for W iloyah I (Region I) which covers 
the districts of Baucau, Viqueque, Loutem and Monatuto 
and is based in Baucau. Lieutenant-Colonel Hidayat, 
currently mi Ii tary commander of Ermera, was installed as 
assistant governor for Wilayoh II which is based in 
Ermero and covers the districts of Ermera, Liquica, Aileu 
and Manufahi. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Ginting, currently 
Assistant II of the East Ti mor Regional Mi Ii tary Command, 
was installed as assistant governor for Wilayah Ill based 
in Maliano which includes the districts of Bobonaro, 
Ambeno[OeCussi],Ainaroe11d Kovalima [SuaraPembaruan, 
30 Morch 19 87]. 
These appointments reflect a heightened level of 
militarisation of East Timor's civil administration; It 
also suggests dissatisfaction in the armed forces with 
the performance of the territory's administra.tors. as 
reflected in an angry outburst by General Murdana during 
a visit to Dili on 21 April when he accused the people of 
'wasting time day-dreaming about useless things" (Jakarta 
Post, 25 Apr i 1 19 87), 
Carrascolao's position on the line 
Mario Viegas Carroscalao, the governor of East Timor 
who hos served Jakarta well since his appointment in 
1982 faces the possibility of replacement when his term 
of office expires on 19 September. Since he hos served 
for only one term, however, the Interior Minister hos 
mentioned him as one of several serving governors who 
might be appointed to serve a second term. 
Corroscaloo has meanwhile become embroiled in a dispute 
about East Timor's "special status" which was recently 
defended by Foreign Minister, Mochtor Kusumootmadja. One 
consequence of "special status" is that imports come into 
the territory duty-free, the idea being to keep prices 
down. However, import prices in the shops in East Timor 
are considerably higher than in Indonesia. 
"Special status" keeps E. Timor closed 
"Special status" in fact relates to much more than 
economic 'benefits'. It is the basis for wide-ranging 
restrictions on access to East Timor for foreign visitors 
as we! I as for Indonesians. While Carroscalao is pushing 
for the abolition of privileged economic status which 
benefits traders and no-one else, he has admitted that 
although "we are heading for abolition of this status •.• 
don't take this to mean that East Timor will be totally 
open" [Jakarta Post, 2 May 1987). 
Carrascalao has also complained recently of serious 
unemployment in EastTimor. While the local government is 
not able to absorb more than fifty new civil servants 
each year, the private sector where Indonesian companies 
ore active is not willing to employ Timorese. 
He also said that East Timorese graduates were refusing 
to work in other ports of the country because their 
'national orientation' did not support them in that goal" 
[Jakarta Post, 2 Moy 1987]. It would appear that 
Carrascolao was complaining about discrimination against 
the many East Timorese who have been encouraged to pursue 
studies in Indonesian colleges and universities. * 
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The privatisation of 
transmigration 
It was Indonesia's minister of the environment, Emil 
Salim, who delivered the classic assessment of the 
transmigration programme when he compared it to "soiling 
in a boot. Some of the passengers are nailing down the 
timber, others are lodl ing out the water while yet 
others are still trying to decide where the boot is 
supposed to be going" [Sinor Harapal'\ 21 February 1984). 
A year after TAPOL, along with Survival International 
and Friends of the Earth, launched a campaign to expose 
the transmigration programme and call for on end to 
international funding, the programme is fast changing 
shape. It is time therefore to look at some basics and 
examine where the programme is now heading. 
A jungle of types and categories 
Lampung in South Sumatra was one of the earliest sites 
for transmigrants from Java. In the days before the 
Transmigration Deportment was born, there were no fewer 
than twenty-one types of transmigration sites. Virtually 
every off ice and department had its own project, social 
affairs, youth affairs, the boy scouts movement, securit{. 
and defence, and many more [ Merdeko, 30 April 1987. 
It was one of Minister Mortono's major achievements to 
rationalise this into seven types: agricultural, gorderi 
produce, people's nucleus estates (PIR), cattle-rearing, 
mining and industry, forestry and sapta marga [ Kompas, 
11 March 1987). The types were now identified by the 
economic activity involved, except for sites set up for 
members of the armed forces, the 'sopta margo' sites. 
The objectives of the programme have also, over the 
years, taken many turns. In the early beginnings, it was 
seen primarily as the solution to poverty, improving 
welfare by shifting poor people from Java. As the 
programme grew, consu I tants, economists, social 
scientists, local government officials and last but not 
least, the military, sought to beautify the programme by 
giving it high-sounding objectives. .... 
From concentration camp to transmigration site 
10 
Earlier this year a decision was taken at a meeting 
of provincial governors to transfer responsibility 
for nine transmigration sites from the 
Transmigration Department to the governor of the 
Moluccas. The nine units are located on Buru, the 
island where many thousands of political prisoners 
were held for more than ten years. 
Longterm, untried political prisoners working at the 
Buru concentration camp 
Four years ofter the military took power in 1965, 
the army started shipping thousands of untried 
political prisoners from Java to what became known 
as Indonesia's devil's island. Others came from 
Ambon and Sulawesi. Thousands of trade unionists, 
teachers, journalists, peasants and workers were 
exiled, along with some of the country's foremost 
writers like Pramoedya Ananta Toer and academics 
like Professor Soeprapto. These were the men whose 
blood and sweat turned an inhospitable and infertile 
island into one of Indonesia's most successful 
agricultural projects, a model transmigration site. 
The prisoners had no alternative but to produce or 
perish. Many dozens perished - from starvation, 
disease and mal-treatment, and during escape 
attempts. But ofter years of slave labour, Buru 
prison camp began to produce a food surplus which 
was seized by prison commanders and guards and used 
to enrich themselves. 
By 1979 however, most prisoners had been returned 
to Java and little more was heard of Buru. Now it 
appears that even as the prisoners were departing, 
transmigrants were being shipped in, many of them 
retired soldiers from East Java's Brawijaya Division . 
and their families. 
By the time the sites were transferred to the 
local government last month, 4,342 fom i lies, a total 
of 18,030 people, were living in the former prison 
camp. The local head of the transmigration office 
spoke with great enthusiasm about the good life of 
transmigrants on Buru. He praised the government 
for building excellent facilities - bridges, 
irrigation canals, roads and harbours to transport 
produce to other parts of the Moluccas [Suaro 
Merdeko, 11 Morch 1987). Not a word was said about 
the prisoners whose forced labour created this 
wealth. 
All that remains of Buru's prison past is the name 
of the administrative centre. It is still called 
Mako which is short for Markos Komando. This is the 
name by which the command headquarters from which 
the prison camp was run was known. 
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These days, the most popular descriptions or its aims 
are "equalising the achievements of development, 
"evening out incomes", "achieving national unity" and 
"reinforcing people's defence". 
The bureaucrats also became obsessed with classifying 
the transmigrants: transmigran umum (general 
transmigrants); transmigran swakorso PIR (spontaneous 
transmigrants for PIR projects); transmigran swakara 
murni (pure spontaneous transm igrants); transmigran 
swakarsa TBB (spontaneous transmigrants without state 
help); transmigran swakarsa DBB (spontaneous 
tronsmigrants with state help); transmigran liposos 
(urban vagrants and beggars); and transmigran famili 
(people joining relatives entirely at their own expence); 
and many more. 
All this classification inevitably clouded the issue 
but mounting economic difficulties in the post few years 
have at least forced those in charge to re-define the 
objectives ... again! 
Relieving poverty and supplying cheap labour 
The Dutch colonial "transmigration" programme consisted 
of two types, with Sumatra the main target area. On the 
one hand, contract coolies, mainly Javanese and Chinese, 
were forcibly transported to provide plantation owners 
with cheap labour on rubber and tobacco estates and the 
tin mines. They were bound by irksome conditions and 
forced into arduous labour. The other type developed in 
Lampung where impoverished Javanese fleeing from densely 
populated Java were re sett led. 
Reducing population pressure in Java continued to hold 
the bureaucrats' attention, but even with the hundreds of 
thousands moved out in the past decade and a half, 
transmigration has proven woefully inadequate. According 
to figures released recently, the population of Java is 
now 98,7 million and rising by 2.32 million a year. 
Although the third five-year plan (1979 - 1983) exceeded 
its target of resettling 500,000 families, this absorbed 
only 25 per cent of the natural increase. Even the target 
set for the present five-year plan - 750,000 families -
can only have a marginal impact on alleviating poverty 
and reducing the population in Java. 
But with the rise in the number of foiled sites, on top 
of the economic crisis now gripping Indonesia, emphasis 
has shifted away from quantity to quality. This coincided 
with a shift in favour of nucleus estates or "PIR-Trans" 
which also serves the government's aim of raising the 
level of non-oil exports. 
IWGIA Document 57 
TAANSMIGRASI: 
Indonesian Resettlement Policy. 196S - 198S 
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The formula for PIR-Trans sites is very different from 
the old-style transmigration sites. Transmigrants have 
their own garden plots to cultivate while working as wage 
labour on the nucleus estate. After a few years of 
applying this new concept, the results have been no 
better that the old, discredited system. Case studies in 
Sumatra and Sulawesi have shown results just as 
disastrous as the agricultural sites. The list of 
complaints is depressingly familiar. Poor or unsuitable 
soils, lack of roads, unreliability of facilities, and so 
on. 
In many PIR sites, the transmigrants are reduced to 
relying on their gardens in order to survive, or becoming 
full-time labourers, or still worse, they drift into 
nearby towns in search of a livelihood. One group decided 
to return to Temanggung, Central Java. Responding to 
their description of the dreadful conditions on the PIR 
site they had abandoned, Martone accused them of being 
~orkshy" [ Kedoulotan Rakyat, 2 April 1987). 
The new phase - agribusiness 
Gradually, it has dawned on the authorities, including 
Martono, that transmigration is not the solution. 
Recently there has been a perceptible change in the 
discussion about transmigration. In seminars held in the 
past few months, speakers hove called for a switch away 
from the centre-periphery concept, pushing people out and 
building the facilities around them. The idea now is to 
create the facilities and infra-structure first so as to 
attract people away from over-crowded Java. More and 
more, the system is geared to this approach. Martono even 
seems to be implying that general (ie. state-sponsored) 
transmigration is a dying breed, which is now being 
replaced by spontaneous transmigration. 
The focus is now on appeals to businessmen to invest in 
plantations, fish and shrimp ponds and business ventures 
to produce cash crops. More responsibility is being 
placed on provincial governments to create new centres of 
'multi-purpose' activity, for agriculture, industry, 
mining and commerce. As Sukdmdani Gitosardiono, chairman 
of the Chamber of Industry (Kadin) puts it: "satellite 
towns" providing support in an integrated fashion to 
transmigration sites, in order to make optimal use of the 
economic potentials of that particular region [ Kompas, 20 
April 1987). The satellite towns would provide all the 
necessary infra-structure like roads, harbours, airports 
and telecommunications. This, according to Sukamdani is 
the best way to convince private capital to invest in 
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plantations and other productive activity. 
The investors best placed to grasp such opportunities 
ore members of the Suharto group who control a huge chunk 
of the economy. Sukomdoni is himself port of the group. 
To these people with vast amounts of accumulated wealth, 
the new outlets in agribusiness ore a godsend. A glance 
at the list of agribusinesses set up in the past year or 
so points to the predominance of the three Suharto sons, 
the so-called 'Tosibo brothers'. 
Is Mortono digging his own grave? 
This new trend means a declining role for the 
Transmigration Deportment. Martono already foresees 
drastic cutbacks, people toking early retirement, no new 
employees being taken on, and local off ices being closed 
down. Yet there is no slowdown in the flow of 
transm igronts. In 1986/87, 158, 333 fam ii ies were moved, 
exceeding the target by 8,333 families. Of these, 103,928 
families were swokorso or spontaneous tronsmigronts 
[ Merdeko and Suora Merdeko, 13 Morch 1987]. Mortono's 
revised target for the current year is 160,000 families, 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
higher than the annual target in the five-year pla.n. 
But won't the 65 per cent cutback in government funding 
for transmigration affect this flow? Apparently not, for 
as one academic remarked recently, this amount could be 
saved by stopping "leakages" of funds. "I estimated that 
leaks account for about 50 per cent of the Department's 
budget," said Sri Bintang Pomungkos. The leaks occur at 
every level, surveying, preparation of sites, erect_ion of 
housing compounds, recruitment and transportation of 
transmigrants, and supplying them with their supplies for 
the first year [Surabaya Pos, 2 April 1987]. 
Pamungkas is very much in favour of privatising 
transmigration. He advocates an end to what he calls 
"old-style transmigration". Under the "new-style" 
programme, the buzz words will be regional development, 
private investment and privately-run plantations. 
But in all the talk about optimal use of regional 
resources, not a word is said about respecting the rights 
of the local populations, protecting the environment or 
safeguarding human rights. Indeed it is not difficult to 
forecast that privately-run profit-making enterprises 
will cause for more havoc for the indigenous people and 
their habitat than poverty-stricken tronsmigronts hoping 
to eke out on existence in poorly prepared sites or from 
nearby forest-lands. 
But as the programme is transformed and agribusiness 
tokes over, the one permanent feature wi II be its role in 
serving the interests of national defence. * 
Internat i ona I PEN honours Pramoedya 
An international meeting of writers in Lugano, 
Switzerland has called for the release from city arrest 
of one of Indonesia's foremost writers, Promoedyo Anonta 
Toer. Promoedyo had been invited to attend the conference 
of International PEN but his restricted status made it 
impossible for him to leave the country. 
Shortly before the meeting, Promoedya drafted the 
following list of demands for consideration by the 
writers' organisation: 
* The return of my manuscripts that were stolen in Buru 
Island just before I returned to Java. 
* The return of my manuscripts stolen from my home. 
* The return of my manuscripts, collection of books, 
journals and newspapers stolen on 13 October 1965 [the 
day on which Pramoedyo was arrested]. 
• The restoration of my civil rights (and for all other 
former prisoners): 
a. the return of my house, its contents, and my land, 
and at least ten years of forced labour without having 
been convicted by a court of law, . 
b. the ending of the unconstitutional obligation to 
report regularly to the authorities imposed since the end 
of 1979 on former prisoners; the restoration of voting 
rights to people whose franchise rights have never been 
constitutional I y suspended; the lifting of the ban on the 
right to express opinions orally or in writing when it 
hos not been proven that such opinions would lead to 
disorder; the restoration of the right to reply to 
slanders and attacks mode against us in the press; the 
restoration of the right to reply to slanders mode by the 
rulers. 
Because of communications problems, the demands did not 
reach the meeting in time for consideration. 
International PEN resolution 
The following resolution was adopted by the writers 
meeting in Lugono: 
"The Assembly of Delegates gathered at the 
International PEN congress in Lugono in Moy 1987 regrets 
that the new generation in Indonesia hos no knowledge of 
its notion's greatest writer, Pramoedyo Anonto Toer. 
Although internationally acclaimed, Toer's fiction and 
non-fiction were officially banned from 1965 to 1979; in 
1981, ofter the publication of his two best-selling 
historical novels, Mon's World and A Child of all 
Nations, all of his works were once again banned. Toer 
continues to write without hope of an audience in his own 
country. 
"The Assembly of Delegates expresses concern for Toer 
who, after spending fourteen years, from 1965-1979, in 
Buru prison, is now under city arrest, and it appeals to 
the Indonesian Government to release him from police 
survei llonce, to allow him to move about freely and 
travel and to permit the publication of his works."* 
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Heaviest usroh sentences to date 
Since the last T APOL Bulletin when we reported six more 
convictions of Muslims active in the usroh movement, 
another seven sentences have been passed down with 
sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years. 
Theusrohmovement is a grassroots Muslim movement with 
many followers in Central Java which advocates a return 
to piety and organises its members in small home-based 
groups. [See Chapter 7 of Indonesia, Muslims on Trial, 
published by TAPOL in April 1987, price £4.00.) 
As these trials were proceeding, the chief prosecutor 
for Central Java warned people against dreaming about 
establishing a state with communist, liberal or religious 
principles [ Kedaulatan Rakyat, 20 March 1987). 
Two groups of men were sentenced in Brebes, on the 
north coast of Central Java, and have been given the 
heaviest sentences yet inf 1 icted on usroh members. Achmad 
Syafei, 29, a cobbler (mistakenly referred to in TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 80, page 12 as Abdullah Somari), Gazali, 23, 
and Ramdhon, 23, who are both traders, were all given 
sentences of fourteen years for being members of usroh 
and giving lectures at usroh courses. 
A fourth man tried in Brebes, Agil Riyanto bin 
Darmowiyotq. 25, a student of sociology, was sentenced to 
fifteen years because he ran an usroh training course at 
a campus mosque in Gajah Mada university, Jogjakarta. 
Two friends who are said to have helped run this course, 
i denti ff ed only as 'ASS' and 'MhC1, are described· as 
still being at large [Suara Merdeka, 17 March 1987). 
A few weeks later, three high school pupils were 
sentenced at the same court in Brebes and given seven 
years each for attending usroh training sessions and 
giving lectures. They are lbnu Zahir, 22, Wahyudi, 18, 
and Untung Slamet Prihatin, 18. In addition Untung was 
charged with plotting to murder a local administrator 
after hearing a lecture by lbnu at an usroh meeting 
[Suara Merdeka, 10 April]. The prosecutor, who had 
demanded fifteen years for the three youngsters, 
announced that he would appeal against the sentences. 
Meanwhile in Banyumas, south of Central Java, another 
usroh trial came to an end with a 25-year old student at 
Gajah Mada university, Mahasin Zaini, being sentenced to. 
twelve years for usroh lecturing in Jogjakarta, Brebes, 
Muntilan and Banyumas. Like other defendants in these 
usroh trials, Mahasin did not deny his part in the 
movement, but he did reject the constructions put on the 
movement by the authorities. 
Mahasin's teacher identified only by the initial F was 
said to be the man who introduced Mahasin into usroh. 
There are still many people being referred to at the 
trials only by their initials, suggesting that usroh 
trials are likely to continue for some time to come. 
Air force major found guilty of subversion 
A report in Kompas [3 April 1987) mentions for the 
first time the trial of a major in thti lndoDeslan air 
force which ended with a sentence of eleven years. Major 
Ir. Yakub Ishak, 51 was charged with subversion on .the 
grounds that he knew about the activities of the Jemaah 
Islam, the group held responsible for the hijack of a 
Garuda plane in March 1981 and for an attack on a police 
station in Cicendo, West Java a few weeks earlier. He 
was not held to Je a member of the group. 
It appears that a pistol used by the hijackers belonged 
to Major Yakub although he maintains that it was stolen 
from his house while he was not at home. The court 
suggested that he was further implicated in the incident 
because his cousin, Amrin Nur was a member of the Jemaah 
Islam. 
Arrests in Banda Aceh 
Indonesian clippings on recent Muslim trials so far 
available to T APOL have been confined to Java-based 
newspapers. However, a cover story on the Indonesian 
elections in the Far Eastern Economic Review [23 April 
1987) refers to trials that have also taken place in 
Banda Aceh, North Sumatra. The journal makes a brief 
reference to Samsul Ambiya, 23, a student at Syah Kuala 
university who was given a one-year sentence along with a 
friend and "an undetermined number of radicals arrested 
in May 1986 on suspicion of subversion". * 
Musi i ms march on Sigl i 
There are signs that the election has left many 
Acehnese with a sense of grievance. Groups of Muslims 
clad in long robes and bearing swords are reported to 
have marched into several towns in Aceh, North 
Sumatra, distributing leaflets and carrying huge 
banners proclaiming Islamic slogans. 
A group of thirty men entered the town of Sigli in 
Pidie District, shouting "Allahu Akbar". They had 
walked for several hours, setting out after dawn 
prayers at their mosque twelve kilometres away, and 
reaching the outskirts of the town at 7.30 am. They 
were prevented from entering the town by armed 
troops. After an angry confrontation during which 
the troops fired shots into the air, the men . were 
taken to the headquarters of kodim, the local 
military command and held for questioning. Thousands 
of people surrounded the kodim premises, "anxious to 
see what was going on". A similar march also took 
place in Meulaboh, West Aceh. 
One of the leaders of the group arrested in Sigli 
said they were not members of the PPP, nor were they 
supporters of the Aceh Liberation Front. "We are 
Muslims who are struggling for justice and truth," 
he told journalists. 
The men are not described as poor villagers but 
people "of substance" who are well-known community 
leaders [Kompas, 16 May 1987]. 
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International Commission of Jurists, Indonesia and the 
Rule of Law: Twenty Years of 'New Order' Government, 
Francis Pinter (Publishers) Ltd, London, 1987. Hardback: 
£25.00. 
Like many highly-regarded organisations and groups around 
the globe, the International Commission of Jurists was 
hoping to visit Indonesia for a study of human rights in 
preparation for this book. It sought permission twice, in 
1979 and 1980, and was refused both times. 
The list of organisations refused entry to Indonesia 
would read like a Who's Who of the world's most respected 
human rights organisations - Amnesty International, 
Washington's Asia Watch, London's Parliamentary Human 
Rights Group, the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, the Federation Internationale des Droits de 
l'l-lomme in Paris, Canberra's Parliamentary Amnesty group, 
to mention but o few. Even UN agencies concerned with 
refugees and labour issues, as well os the International 
Red Cross hove had to contend with Jakarta's stubborn 
refusal to allow free access to the victims of its many 
abuses. 
Fortunately, this did not deter the ICJ from pressing· 
ahead with this very valuable examination of the legal 
framework of Indonesia's system of repression. With all 
its faults, this book provides the Joy reader with o 
thorough-going and well-documented description of the 
warped constitutionolism that has been constructed since 
1965 under Suharto's guidance. The more's the pity that 
it is available only in hardback, at a price well beyond 
the pockets of many who could make good use of the ICJ's 
considerable efforts. 
Martial law in perpetuity 
The examination of Indonesia's institutionalised 
repression is divided into three chapters - one on 
constitutional low and the legal framework, one on civil 
and political rights and one on criminal justice. 
Certainly, the crux of the first of these core chapters 
is the section on Kopkamtib, Suharto's Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, set up 
at the beginning of October 1965 and correctly presented 
here as the key instrument to maintain the government's 
authority, exercising virtually unlimited power (p. 72). 
As Kopkomtib itself odmi ts in o 1977 publ icotion quoted 
by the ICJ, its powers to deal with every threat to 
internal security and order mokes it unnecessary to 
resort to proclamations of martial law or states of 
emergency. In other words, Kopkomtib's existence is akin 
to a system of martial law in perpetuity. 
The chapter on civil and political rights includes what 
is probably the most comprehensive account of press 
censorship in Indonesia, examining the history of press 
control, the current lows governing censorship, the 
system of not-to-publish instructions which haunts every 
section of the media and strict controls over the foreign 
press. The section on the absence of trade union rights 
relies heavily on the publications produced for several 
years by INDOC, the Indonesian Documentation Centre in 
Leiden, Holland. In fact, the strength of this account 
only reinforces the sense of loss caused by INDOC's 
decision in 1986 to discontinue the annual updates of its 
seminal 1981 book, Indonesian Workers and the Right to 
Organise. Is it not time for that decision to be revised? 
The ICJ's account of the ILO's consideration of forced 
labour in Indonesia is mistaken to say that this was 
initially focused on the plight of contract labourers in 
North Sumatra, among whom were many former trade unionist 
political prisoners (p. 134). In fact, the ILO first 
accused Indonesia of violating the ILO Convention 
prohibiting forced labour when it took up, early in the 
1970s, the plight of the 13,000 or so political prisoners 
exiled to Buru who were made to work on the army's 
agricultural project. The complaints voiced throughout 
the 1970s in Geneva certainly helped convince the regime 
to abandon the Buru project and release the prisoners. 
It is also very disappointing to see that the section 
on freedom of movement and residence completely overlooks 
the massive re-settlement of hundreds of thousands of 
East Timorese. Yet nowhere hos the Jakarta regime token 
the control of movement and residence to such extremes as 
in East Timor. The account mentions East Timor but only 
because of restricted access for outside observers, o 
matter which properly belongs to another section of the 
book. 
Elsewhere, while strong support is expressed for East 
Timor's right to self-determination (p. 15-21), West 
Papua's equally profound right is spurned on the grounds 
of "the absence of more firm rules about how to exercise 
the right to self- determination" (p. 23). There ore 
plenty of UN resolutions setting down rules for the 
exercise of self-determination, regardless of the General 
Assembly's shameful acceptance of the farcical 'act of 
free choice' in West Papua in 1969. 
Criminal justice and human rights 
The third main oreo of examination deals with the 
system of criminal justice, looking in detail ot the 
Criminal Procedures Code known as KUHAP [Kitob Undong-
Undong Hukum Acora Pidono], enacted in December 1981. 
This chapter, written by o Dutch lawyer J. t'Hort, hos 
already appeared in Indonesian under the title Hukum 
Acaca Pidono Dolam Perspektif Hok Azasi Manusio [Criminal 
Procedures Code from a Human Rights Perspective]. 
t'Hort explains the KUHAP provisions to safeguard the 
rights of people under arrest and detention, during 
interrogation and on trial, comparing them with the 
treatment suffered by anyone who fol ls into the hands of 
Indonesia's low enforcement agencies. This chapter is 
essential reading for anyone who wonts to understand the 
realities of the show-trials being conducted in Indonesia 
today. Many of KUHAP's provisions are fine but lock the 
bocking of legal sanctions. When you add to this a 
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judiciary that is nothing more than an arm of the 
executive, doing the bidding of national and local 
military administrators, it is easy to see why the very 
idea of a fair trial in Indonesia, especially for the 
regime's political opponents, ls out of the question. 
Nor does t'Hart believe that reopening politic~l 
discussion on KUHAP, the contents of which reflect 
persistent lobby lng by human rights lawyers, would 
reinforce its human rights content. "The structural 
conditions for realising improvements remain 
unfavourable •••• In the present climate of increasing and 
overwhelming executive power, a change to a real 
independence of the judiciary as a forceful counter-
balance is hardly to be expected," he concludes (p. 204). 
Ideological basis overlooked 
This conclusion brings us back to the damaging flaw in 
this publication, its failure to understand the ideology 
of Suharto's 'New Order' which is rooted in anti-
communism, anti-liberalism, rejection of political 
activism, extreme authoritarianism and an undying belief 
in the army's eternal right to govern. 
Failure to understand this leads to misleading remarks 
about the initial drive of the New Order being for the 
re-establishment of the Rule of Low (p. 76). The ICJ hos 
been taken in by Suharto's early professions of wonting 
to redress the constitutional improprieties of his 
predecessor, Sukarno. No-one who looks at the atrocities 
committed by the army under Suharto's direct command in 
the very first days of the 'New Order' can possibly 
believe this. 
Still worse, the book accepts the Suharto version of 
the 1 October 1965 events as on abortive communist coup, 
relegating mention of accounts that dispute this to a 
footnote. It describes Suharto as a "relatively unknown 
general (sic) ... who escaped the attack" which led to the 
murder of six generals (p. 7). Yet it is well recognised 
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that Suharto was never a target of the k idnop squads, was 
a close associate of all the main plotters and even met 
one of them three hours before the kidnap squads set out. 
Rather than repeat allegations that President Sukarno 
might himself have been involved in this 'abortive coup' 
(p. 7), the ICJ could have mentioned, if only briefly, 
the many arguments pointing to Suharto's own involvement 
in what turned out to be a highly successful coup that 
ushered in the New Order. 
The terror unleashed against millions of alleged 
communists is barely mentioned yet the New Order's claim 
to legitimacy uses the alleged communist threat as its 
main, indeed only, justification. The two instruments of 
repression, Kopkamtib and the anti-subversion l(Jw, rest 
on claims of a continued threat from the left. 
Nor is it correct to describe the government's decision 
to release tens of thousands of political prisoners 
"detained following the abortive (sic) coup of 1965" as 
"an important step towards reconciliation and respect for 
human rights" (p. 29). The release programme was guided 
by concern for international pressure and anxiety that 
President Carter might find it difficult to supply 
aircraft with which to bomb East Timor into oblivion 
while tens of thousands of untried tapols remained behind 
bars. To talk of reconciliation glosses over the 
continuing persecution of more than a million communist 
suspects. Nor does the book deal properly with the 
systematic curtailment of their civil and political 
rights. 
The book con be faulted for many errors in Indonesian 
spellings. A glossary would have helped the reader sort 
out the many acronyms and a bibliography would have 
enhanced the value of this book as a source of reference. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
Published by: T APOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy 
terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, 
conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or 
journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing 
incidents that were never properly investigated. 
The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 
1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed 
crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military 
government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from 
proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime. 
'The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state 
that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing W estem norms 
and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers 
is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial Although it focuses on events in 
Indonesia, this study will help one W\derstand why Muslim nation states are inherently 
unstable and are invariably held together by oppression." 
Dr. M. Gbayasuddln, Editor, Musllmedla 
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I INTERVIEW I 
West Papuan refugee interviewed II 
In November, 1985, three West Papuan refugees reached the 
Australian island of Boigu blJ canoe and asked for 
political as1jlum. Later, others followed, bringing the 
number of eleven. 
Could we go back for a moment to the period before the 
so-called act of free choice in 1969? What was happening 
in the way of political activities and armed operations? 
After the Dutch left West Papua in 1962, political 
activities spread gradually to all ports of the country, 
to Kotoboru [now Jayapura], Siok, Manokwari, Sorong, 
Ponioi, Fak-fok and Merouke. Already before I arrived in 
Merouk e in 1968, Popuons there hod been arrested and 
detained. They included two well-known leaders, Chris 
Posso Gebze and Johonis Tomberon, as well as people 
working at the government health deportment in Merouke, 
former members of the Dutch pol ice force and men former I y 
of the Popuon Volunteers Corps who were by then in the 
(Indonesian) armed forces. [The names provided in the 
interview ore withheld.]*) The people involved come from 
oil walks of life, the armed forces, the police, 
government employees, villagers, fishermen, students, 
unemployed, men, women and youngsters. 
Some were tried but others weren't because of lock of 
evidence and were eventually released. Among those 
convicted were Sergeant Pulolo, Corporal Bimoroi and 
Corporal Tourui who, along with other friends, were sent 
to Jayapura and imprisoned there by the Military Police. 
A detainee in Merauke named Napet died in his cell as a 
result of his treatment at Korem (m ii itarr command) 172 
Merauke. [Korem 172 is now in Abepuro. Nopet fel 1 ill 
and died from a poisonous injection by the Indonesians. 
I should also mention Aloysius Kendou Gebze, formerly a 
member of the Dutch-sponsored New Guinea Assembly. He 
wonted to meet Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, the UN observer sent 
to oversee the act of free choice [known in lndonesion as 
'Pepera']. But when the Indonesians found out, they 
arrested him and held him in detention till ofter Pepera. 
He later died in 1983 at Merauke General Hospital ofter 
on injection of poison by on Indonesian doctor. 
Chris Posso Gebze who I mentioned earlier died in 
hospital in 1979. He went there for treatment and died 
from poison injected by on Indonesian doctor. Johonis 
Tomberan also died at the Merouke General Hospital from 
an attack of asthma. 
OPM [Free Papua Movement] operations against the poro-
commcridos [then called RPKAD] were in response to these 
arrests. Many people fled and formed a unit which 
attacked an army post in Erombu vi lloge, Kol i Moro. OPM 
troops or med with knives, choppers and bows and arrows, 
killed two Indonesian soldiers and a government employee. 
Bren guns captured during this first OPM attack were 
used in a second attack on Janggandur when some thirty 
Indonesian soldiers were killed. They were buried at the 
Trikoro Heroes' Cemetery in Merouke as heroes of the 
Trikoro Operation [launched by Indonesia against the 
Dutch before 1962] but this is a lie. They were killed in 
a bottle between the OPM and Indonesian troops. 
The para-commandos were led at the time by Lieutenant 
Wismoyo[Wismoyo is now a major-general and is commander 
of the Trikoro Military Command for Irion Joya and 
Eastern Indonesia.] The OPM forces were led by Sergeant 
Joku and Corporal Flosi, both formerly of the Volunteer 
Corps. 
*) Remarks added in square brackets are from TAPOL. 
One of the first three, Thomas Agakl} Wanda, recently 
contacted TAP O L offering to give an account of his 
experiences. The first part appeared in TA POL Bulletin No 
80. The final installment will appear in No. 82. 
The 1977 and 1982 elections in West Papua 
How were the 1977 general elections conducted in West 
Papua? Did Papuans take part voluntarily or was 
compulsion used by the authorities? 
A lot of compulsion was used in the 1977 election. One 
proof is that villagers from Erombu fled across the 
border to PNG ofter being punished for placing their 
voting slips in the PDI box, not in the Golkar box. 
Indonesian soldiers were forcing people to put their 
slips in the Golkor box but people didn't wont to do this 
so they were beaten and mal-treated as a result. [It is 
not widely known that the method of placing voting-slips 
in separate party boxes hos been used in the elections in 
West Papua since 1977. This system was also used in East 
Timor in 1982 and 1987. See separate item.] 
'Erambu villagers fled to PNG 
after being punished for placing their 
voting slips in the PDI ho~ 
not in the Golkar box.' 
The outhori ties checked on how people voted by making a 
hole in the bock of the place where the different party 
boxes were placed so that off iciols could eosi ly see 
where people put their slips. Anyone using the POI box 
was summoned and beaten up. This is why villagers from 
E ram bu fled to PNG. All the talk about the elect ions 
being free, direct and secret is rubbish. 
At the time of the 1982 election, I was in detention 
but ofter I was released, I heard from friends that it 
was just the some as in 1977. If persuasion foiled to 
make people vote the right way, the iron fist was used. 
One fellow I know named Chris Gilouw was arrested with 
several others and ordered to support Golkor. 
Sometimes, Golkor members sabotaged the other parties 
by toking voting slips from their boxes and putting them 
in Golkar's box. Civil servants were questioned before 
the elections so that the authorities could find out who 
was not intending to support Golkar. 
Arrest and detention 
So, what about your own detention? 
On 30 June 1981, I was summoned by the Mako Sub Den Porn 
172/2-1 Merauke (Merouke military police headquarters) 
and questioned about the escape of Akhtaruzzomon Khan a 
Bcrigladeshi sympathetic to the OPM. Two weeks earlier t~o 
friends, Joseph Renrusum and Hermon Woei, were arrested. 
We three aid two others, Heronimus Ngilaime Gebze and 
Aioyisius Bosik-Bosik, were all involved in this escape. 
This tlme, I was arrested by Lieutenant Musto 'Id and 
Sergeant Arief Selmuri of the intelligence unit of the 
17th Cendrowosih Military Command who were port of the 
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special-tasks intelligence unit under the regional 
Kopkamtib [the army's security command] officer. Before 
finding out about our group, they had arrested people in 
Mindiptanah and Waropko, including government employees -
teachers, nurses and even village-heads. 
Some time earlier, Pangkodap V, OPM regional commander 
Gorry Tomi [Gerardus Thorny] had arrived in Merauke after 
walking from the interior of Jayapura. After passing 
through the regions of Mindiptanah and Waropka, various 
activities began there, flag-raising ceremonies and so 
on. One person involved in these activities, David Kopok, 
took his younger brother to Jayapura in 1981 for medical 
treatment. After reaching Jayapura, his wife wrote to the 
military reporting on his activities. So as he left 
Jayapura for home, he was arrested at Sentani airport. 
During interrogation, David was unable to deny the 
charges made by his wife. This led to the arrest of many 
people working in Mindiptanah and Waropko by two officers 
sent there from Merauke. It was while interrogating these 
people that the army got wind of our activities. My two 
friends Herman Woei and Joseph Renrusun were arrested and 
forced to make confessions which led to my arrest. 
I was arrested on 30 June 1981 and, after being 
stripped of my official uniform and thrown into a cell, I 
was interrogated about the escape of Akhtaruzzaman Khan. 
My briefcase was seized from my office. Some letters from 
Alex Tomboy and Tarcis Jawa were discovered, along with 
headed notepaper of the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of West Papua New Guinea which I had received 
from Henk Joku via my network in Maro River region. 
A week later Musto 'Id and Arief left Merauke, and from 
about 17 July, I was subjected to three nights of 
interrogation when I was kicked and beaten. Herman Woei, 
Joseph Renrusun and Fransiskus Walek suffered the same 
treatment. Others involved in this case included several 
service chiefs and government employees. [Names and 
positions withheld]. 
On 24 July, I was flown by a Hercules air force plane 
from Merauke to Jayapura under the escort of Sergeant-
Major Soegiono and taken to the headquarters of the 
intelligence unit of the 17th Military Command [Kodam 
17). After being registered, I was taken to the guard 
post and put in a cell. For several days, I was not 
allowed out to wash or use the toilet. I was given only 
one packet of rice and a banana leaf each day. On the 
t~ird day, the rice tasted odd and gave me a splitting 
headache. I examined it and found some powder which I 
took to be poison. I noticed that each rice packet for me 
was given a special marker, a piece of onion skin tied to 
the outer leaf. This happened for several days. So, for 
several days, I ate and drank nothing and could not wash 
or relieve myself. 
'the rice tasted odd 
and gave me a splitting headache. 
I found some powder 
which I took to be poison. 
I noticed that each rice packet 
for me was marked ••• ' 
In any case, the food was far from enough, only a few 
spoonfuls of rice which was often bad, with moldy tempe 
[soyabean cake] and raw spinach. I got food twice a day, 
at 2 pm and 6 pm. If a kind-hearted Papuan was on duty, 
he would bring me water and take me to the bathroom and 
toilet. But when Indonesians or unfriendly Papuans were 
on duty, my bowels and bladder felt as if they would 
burst, and I could only pass very little urine or faeces. 
The other prisoners had the same treatment and some had 
a much worse time than me. I often heard cell doors being 
opened to let in new prisoners or move others elsewhere. 
This went on for about a week. 
On 5 August 1981, I was transferred from Kodam 17 to a 
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Thomas Agaky Wanda on the c<rioe that carried him and his 
two West Papuan friends from Papua New Guinea to Boigu 
island, Australia. 
special cell of the Laksusda [executive officer for 
Kopkamtib, the special security command] which was 
located in the rear of Wisma Pati, the senior officers' 
mess at Dok V. The front of this building was used for 
guests of Kodam 17 or for senior officers from Jakarta. 
while the rear was used for OPM prisoners, known as 
'tahanan Laksusda lrja'. This is typical of the deceit 
practised by the Indonesian government. The prisoners 
here were [some names withheld] along with Bob Kubia, 
Fred Pieger and Wellem Jebleb who had been repatriated 
from PNG. In September 1981, several fr lends were 
transferred to the Regional Interrogation Team of the 
Military Police 17 [names withheld]. 
Our treatment during August and September was somewhat 
better. Our cell-doors were left open until 8 pm but 
there was no improvement in the food as compared with 
Kodam 17. 
A new clampdown 
On 8 October 1981, a morning-star flag-raising incident 
occurred near Tiba-Tiba kampung in Abepura, Jayapura, 
after which there was some shooting by OPM guerrillas. 
This led to numerous arrests of Papuans from many walks 
of life - the unemployed, farmers, fishermen, government 
employees, members of the armed forces, university 
students, school-pupils, young and old, men and women, 
the wel 1-known and the unknown, the deaf, the dumb and 
the blind. These arrests were quite indiscriminate. Here 
are some of the names that I can still remember: Jonas 
Tuu, Paulus Tabisu, Wellem Joku, Agus Elly, Markus Velba, 
police officer E Ison Nero, police officer Semuel lsage, 
Johannis Gentho Rumainum, Arnold Kiryar, Doud Anison, 
Jimmy Arnold Velba and police officer Jowea. 
A week after the flag-raising incident, we were rushed 
away from our cells and hidden in Wisma Kartika near the 
office of the Kodam 17 chief-of-staff because the 
guerrillas were planning to rescue the detainees. From 
that time on, combat troops armed with automatic rifles 
and machine-guns were used to guard the prisoners. In 
mid-November, we were moved bock to Wisma Pati where we 
continued to be guarded by combat troops. 
It was around that time that the relatives of six of 
the prisoners made enquiries about their whereabouts. Our 
cells were kept locked up from 8 November till 31 
December 1981. In the afternoons, the troops were 
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withdrawn leaving only Loksus officers on guard, and 
during all this time, the treatment was the same as at 
Kodom 17. We were not allowed to wash. Food and drink was 
very bod and when we were praying, officers on duty would 
throw stones at us through the cell windows. But the 
deputy commander of the Kodam intelligence unit, Lt-Col 
Soebogiyo allowed us to celebrate Christmas and New Year. 
From 1 January 1982, the prisoners were gradually 
released till only three were left, police corporal 
Jowea, second pol ice sergeant Semual I sage and me. 
In February 1982, I was tranferred to the Regional 
Interrogation Team which functioned under the 17th 
Military Police Corps. Here, I met a number of prisoners 
who hod been in detention since 1979: Justinus Toto, 
Christian Jakadewa, Selgius Poul Wotori, Tholpinus Toto, 
Gerson Sorondanya, Luthers Waisimon, Jan Piet Norotouw, 
Menase Demotouw, Terianus Joku, Suriel Jimmy Tauruy, 
Al:ner Macy, Eddy Auporay-Aronggear, Soter Boryamar, Saul 
Bomay, Jowel Worum i, R ingga Suwae, Jeret Woyoi, Paulus 
Psokor-Kuntui, Paulus Kenop, Budimon Kogoya, Herman 
Mirip, Onesimus Ompe, Elly Jaboisembut, Joseph Marni, 
Celcius Wapay, Janee Numbery, and six women who raised a 
flag in the forecourt of the governor's office in 1980. 
They were: Persilo Jakadewa, Florida (Fonny) Jakadewa, 
Domingos (Minggas) Pisirewa, Marriyones (Marry) Jakadewa, 
Regina (Regy) Jakadewo and Barbalina (Lina) lkari. 
Our treatment here was a little better because the 
officers tried to make it possible for prisoners to get 
their own food from outside and not depend on food from 
the Satgas Intel kitchen. 
The six women told me that after they raised the flag, 
they were arrested by the 1701 Jayapura pol ice and later 
handed over to the special intelligence unit of Kodam 17. 
They were treated the same as the men. Unsuccessful 
attempts were made to force secrets out of them about 
their activities. In the end, the Indonesian officers 
used black magic and gave them areco nuts and betel leaf. 
In this way, some of their secrets did come out. 
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The woman mainly responsible for their activities was 
Persila Jakadewo and her husband Palus Kenop, from the 
Maudobo-Tonah Merah Digul, Merouke tribe. Their daughter, 
Dolly was also in detention for some time and held by the 
Kodom and military police. 
While we were in prison, we were given the opportunity 
to vote in the July 1982 general elections. 
During this period of Pomdam-17 detention, another 
incident occured. A group of students and government 
employees raised a flag in the forecourt of the Irion 
Joya regional assembly (DPRD) building. The names I can 
still remember are Abraham Hegemur, David Heremba, Ismael 
Pottiran, Simon Tuturop, Karel Pattiran, Gerardus Timang, 
Thadius Waripang, Otto Rumawok and Josephine Gewab. 
[Several of these are now in prison in Surabaya.] 
'After being released, 
I went back to my old job 
but I was not given any work to do. ' 
Some time after I was moved to the regional 
interrogation team, I was interrogated. I denied oil the 
accusations against me. In the end, I was released on 29 
October 1982 without being charged or tried. On 9 
November, I returned to Merouke md went back to my old 
job but I was not given any work or responsibilities. I 
was, as we used to say, 'unemployed in the office'. 
The group involved in the flag-raising incident of 3 
July 1982 was detained by the police and tried straight 
from the Abepura prison without being held by the 
regional military command. Maybe this was because the 
Criminal Procedures Code (KUHAP) had just been enacted. 
Just before I was freed, a group of prisoners arrived 
from Bick. There were four people in the group under the 
leadership of Hegemur, the sub-district chief of Biok and 
a man cal led Wompere. 
To be continued in the next issue. 
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ECONOMICS 
Suharto family involved in scandals 
Two major scandals have broken out in Indonesia, both 
involving members of the Suharto family. 
National defence counci I issues worthless 
promissory notes 
The first, and potentially the most damaging scandal 
internationally, involves promissory notes valued at $3.5 
billion which were issued in 1985 by the National Defence, 
Security Council, a body which falls under the Defence 
and Security Department. The notes have proved worthless, 
regardless of the money paid to council officials for 
them. However five European businessmen are being 
indicted in a New York court for trying to sell some of 
these worthless notes. The case is described by US 
investigators as "the biggest attempted securities fraud 
ever" [ Far Eastern Economic Revie~ 14 May 1987). 
Responsibility rests with three NSDC officials who 
signed the notes, Lieut-Gen. Achmad Wiranatakusumah, then 
secretary-general of the council, and two deputies, lbnu 
Hartomo and Soebagyo Soedewo. lbnu Hartomo is the brother 
of the president's wife, Tien Suharto. No-one is saying 
what happened to the money paid over to NDSC officials. 
In an attempt to extricate the government and the armed 
forces from the scandal, the present NDSC leadership has 
disclaimed responsibility, asserting that the notes were 
the responsibility of the three signatories. But it did 
not deny that the three were officials of the council. 
However,the FEERclaims to have documents which suggest 
that the council may have more explaining to do. 
The notes were issued to a Middle Eastern businessman 
who used them to purchase commodities. The Indonesian 
ambassador in Damascus formally endorsed the signatories 
as officials of the NDSC. Businessmen who were tricked 
into accepting them and later tried off loading them on 
others now face charges, while the real culprits in 
Indonesia are not likely to be charged by anyone. 
lbnu Hartomo hos said the notes were issued to finance 
purchases and housing for the armed forces and that 
Suharto was kept informed [Tempo, 28 February 1987). 
$24 million profit on sale of government satellite 
The other scandal involves a deal that will earn the 
president's son Bambang Trihatmodjo, and son-in-law, 
Indra Kowara, a cool $24 million profit for purchasing an 
Indonesian communications satellite launched in 1984 into 
a faulty orbit, and selling it back to the Indonesian 
government. The orbit became the property of an insurance 
company which later sold it to a California-based company 
in which Bambang and Indra's company, E lektrindo 
Nusantara, has a controlling interest. By the time the 
satellite is re-launched in 1989, Elektrindo will have 
incurred costs of $48 million, but is negotiating to sell 
it back to the Indonesian state telecommunications 
company, Perumtel, for $72 million. * 
Source FEER, 30 April, and Jakarta Post, 1 May 1987. 
New foreign loans since December 1986 exceed 
$2.25 billion 
Faced with a huge foreign debt problem and with a debt 
service ratio already approaching forty per cent of 
foreign exchange earnings from exports, Indonesia has 
incurred additional debts of more than $2.25 billion 
since last December. This is in addition to the credit 
which is expected to be approved by the Inter-
Governmental Group on lndonesi.a at its meeting on 17-18 
June. The IGGI is likely to grant at least $2.5 billion, 
the amount agreed by the IGGI at its meeting last June. 
The new credit granted in the past six months includes 
$300 million from the World Bank, $350 million from a 
syndicate of Japanese banks, $900 million from the 
Japanese government, $609 million from the International 
Monetary Fund and $100 million from the US Eximbonk. 
Such a massive expansion of foreign deb.t temporarily 
extricates Indonesia from a situation in which it would 
be paying abroad in interest and principle more than it 
receives in new credit. However, the effect on the future 
debt-service ratio is certain to be disastrous. 
The new credit will bring Indonesia's overall foreign 
indebtedness to more than $45 billion, if private debts 
and publicly-guaranteed private debts are included. 
Government refuses to consider debt-rescheduling 
The rapid growth in the country's debt burden has been 
exacerbated by the sharp fall in oil prices and the foll 
in the rote of the dollar against the Japanese yen and 
European currencies. Most export earnings are in dollars 
but most foreign debt must be repaid in these other 
currencies. 
Recent developments have led to growing pressure from 
economists and businessmen for the government to re-
schedule its debt repayments. There is no sign that the 
government will even consider such a proposal. Government 
spokesmen insist that the recent influx of foreign credit 
is proof that Indonesia's creditors have confidence in 
the economy but Kompas [7 May 1987) sees it as a sign of 
the depth of the country's economic woes. 
Professor Widjoyo Nitisastra, the architect of the 
Suharto regime's economic policy up to 1983, has warned 
that further loans could spell serious difficulties for 
the economy. Frans Seda who represents manufacturing 
interests has called specifically for the government to 
negotiate the re-scheduling of debts falling due in the 
next two years [Kompas, 9 May 1987). 
What businessmen and economists fear is that burgeoning 
debt and rising debt-service obligations will reduce the 
foreign currency available for imports needed to keep 
industrial activity going. This threat to the level of 
business activity, already severely hit by budget 
retrenchment, will further reduce jobs in a country where 
the labour force is rising by more than 1.5 million 
people a year. * 
££ yy $$ 
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UK-INDONESIAN RELATIONS 
More British weapons for Indonesia 
British Aerospace has announced a new order from 
Indonesia for 5 Battery Command Post Processor systems 
(BCPP). The order, worth £500,000, is part of the 
recent I y-announced Indonesian contract for further 
supplies of the British Aerospace Rapier low-level air-
defence system [British Aerospace News, March 1987) 
Although originally developed with Rapier air defence 
missiles in mind, British Aerospace stresses in its 
announcement the wide variety of tasks it can undertake. 
It is suitable "for helicopter support, data-based 
management and a wide variety of other logistics-based 
tasks .•. enabling a battery commander to automate the 
planning, deployment and management of his units in the 
field'. The system can process masses of information from 
many sources, "enabling tasks that formerly took hours to 
be completed in a few minutes". The system can be fitted 
in a landrover or similar vehicle and can be supplied "in 
kit form". 
As described by BAe, the BCPP system is eminently 
suitable for use by the Indonesian army and air force for 
troop deployment and military operations against the 
resistance in East Timor and West Papua. Its sale to 
Indonesia, which is known to have launched military 
operations in both these territories in the past year, 
should under no circumstances be allowed. 
British government's narrow interpretation 
By contrast with BAe propaganda emphasising the 
versatility of the BCPP, the British government told 
David Nellist MP, in a written reply on 6 April, that it 
is "a non-critical part of the Rapier System and has no 
use outside the context of the Rapier". The London-based 
Campaign Against Arms Trade has written to British 
Aerospace asking it to comment on the discrepancy between 
its description of the BCPP's uses and that of the 
British government. 
Information was received last year of a new military 
offensive code-named Operation Extinction in East Timor. 
Operations are known to have proceeded for several months 
Continued from page 1. 
• Action by the justice minister would undermine the 
independence of the legal profession in the conduct of 
advocacy. Such an action, which moreover lacks legal 
grounds, would be seen as a response not to Buyung's move 
to interrupt the judge but to the independence he 
displayed in the conduct of Dharsono's defence.*) 
Finally Buyung reminded the justice minister that the 
judge presiding over the Dharsono trial did not reprimand 
him at the time and did not even mention the incident in 
the records of the trial. The matter was completely 
ignored for a whole month until a move to charge Buyung 
with contempt of court was suddenly made public in 
February 1986, with the government clearly playing an 
active role ln the move. 
Buyung has made it known that he intends to fight the 
government's decision "to the bitter end". The three 
lawyers acting in Buyung's defence in an attempt to 
reverse the minister's decision are: Yap Thiam Hien, 
Mulya Lubis and Albert Hasibuan. * 
*) For details of this trial, see Indonesia: Muslims on 
Trial, published by T APOL, April 1987, price £4.00 plus 
postage. 
in the second half of 1986, and may then have been halted 
because of the rains. On 24 March this year, The 
Independent quoted Reuters as saying that Indonesian 
troops ,,,ave launched new attacks against rebels (in East 
Timor}" ahead of the illegal elections due on 23 April 
1987. 
The British Government has argued, in defence of the 
export of Hawk ground-attack aircraft and Rapier 
missiles, that these are part of a country's legitimate 
defence needs, claiming that they are not suitable for 
use in East Timor. This ignores the fact that the supply 
of such equipment will support the armed forces of a 
regime that has flouted basic principles in the UN 
Charter concerning armed aggression and self-
determination. 
No arms for 
SUHARTO ___ _ 
UK prefabricated bridges for Indonesia 
Indonesia has also placed a £10.7 million order for 397 
prefabricated bailey bridges from the British firm, Mabey 
and Johnson. This order is the first to be financed 
under the £140 million soft loan commitment for Indonesia 
announced by the UK in 1986. 
These bailey bridges are described as being for the use 
of Bina Marga, a state company in charge of building, 
supervising and managing road development in Indonesia 
[Jakarta Post, 8 April 1987). This gives the deal a non-
military sounding purpose, but it is clear that 
prefabricated bridges are a critical part of military 
operations in places like East Timor and West Papua where 
the terrain is difficult and there are hardly any 
surfaced roads and bridges. * 
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